What is obscure? „At
most, they simply demonstrate either the subjects’ ignorance of certain obscure
statistics“ (p. 132) Well, ignorance may indeed be a relative term, but it is
hard to construe the huge numerical preponderance of farmers over librarians as
„obscure“ for anybody not living in a cave. In non-Orwellian speak, “certain
obscure statistics” applies to things like the number of cane toads in
Australia or the famous example of Enrico Fermi, the population of piano-tuners
in Chicago. “Did it occur to you that there are more than male farmers for each
male librarian in the United States?”—as if this information is intuitive or
self-evident.“ (p. 134) it certainly is not self-evident, but contra BT it is
intuitive, since intuition is based (on most reasonable philosophical
construals, e.g., Hume’s “striking resemblance” in A Treatise of Human
Nature) on actually having some prior knowledge on relationship of
empirical objects. Of course, BT are free to use their own definition of what
is intuitive or not – but are hardly entitled to criticize Kahneman for not sticking
to their private definition in this respect.
„When
respondents perform poorly, the reader is led to interpret their failure as a
cognitive bias, although simple ignorance of either quantitative technique or
of relevant facts suffices to explain it.“ (p. 134) Alternative explanations –
which are, interestingly enough, not entertained by BT – include low IQ, iodine
deficiency, serious
depression, or simple laziness.
On bats
and balls: “This
is not at all a simple puzzle. The fact that it involves bats, balls, and small
amounts of money makes it look simple and thus lulls respondents into thinking
they should have the answer ready. In reality, this is a system of two
equations with two unknowns—the type of mathematical problem that, in the
United States, is not learned until at least the eighth grade, if ever.“ (p.
135)
Now, an
interesting issue is why should the US education system (a broken one, btw,
according to authors so disparate as Alan Bloom, Francis Fukuyama, Judith
Butler, or Bernie Sanders) be a norm here? Even more interesting is how in the
world could a person buying chocolate in two different packages in
two shops for a fixed amount of money establish whether she received correct
change at the counters or one shop is indeed cheaper than the other? This is
also a system of two equations with two unknowns. And a person incapable of
deciding so might not be irrational in the narrow sense of BT, but in reality
should not be trusted very much. There are countless examples of similar
problems involving two equations with two unknowns appearing in everyday
contexts. Some adults take some kids to a movie, five people in all. The cost
for adults is $9 and the cost for kids is $6. They paid a total of $36. How
many kids are there?
„[T]he
question is not only outside our normal range of experience and therefore
irrelevant to the lives of most people.“ (p. 135) Only those people not doing
shopping – or those not very careful with their money, or those not likely to
go with kids to a movie, or... On a serious note, this assertion that what
is outside our own range of experience is therefore irrelevant
to our lives or to the lives of most people is, at best, outright bizarre. As
someone who did some work in risk analysis, I find this claim preposterous.
Rational people take into account events outside their own range of experience
all the time – the insurance industry would not exist otherwise. Our own death
is by definition outside our range of experience (alleged
after-death experiences or spiritism notwithstanding) and yet people invest in
life insurance all the time. Large natural catastrophes like tsunamies, large
earthquakes, supervolcanic eruptions, etc. are outside of range of experience
of most people – and yet are supremely relevant for anyone on the planet.
Nuclear war has been, fortunately, outside our own range of experience so far –
and yet is utterly relevant for all lives on the planet, human and animal and
plant alike. In claiming this, BT show surprising narrow-mindedness and – yes,
ironically, considering their parable above – large degree of self-absorption.
On
geography: „There
really should be no surprise that a subject asked about the total number of
murders in Michigan is not able to invoke two different pieces of information
never mentioned in the question: that Detroit is a high-crime city and that
Detroit is in Michigan.“ (p. 135)
Consider a
related statement: There really should be no surprise that a voter
asked about the promise of a candidate for the governor of Michigan to reduce
the number of murders in Detroit is not able to invoke two different pieces of
information never mentioned in the question: that Detroit is a high-crime city
and that Detroit is in Michigan. Plus, the voter was never explicitly told that
reduction in the number of murders is desirable, therefore she cannot make
rational judgement on the candidate’s program. And yet, and yet, the
voter will be – irrationally? – asked to make a judgement on those issues at
the time of elections.
The example
in footnote 3 is even worse, since it is unintelligible: if drivers
believe that they are better than the average and the average is being
construed as “unexceptional”, what in the world could it mean for someone to be
“better than unexceptional”? One could similarly argue that he is “fitter than
yellow” or “more intelligent than mountainous”; it could mean something only in
the context of a Derridian or a Žižekian farrago of nonsense.
„A student
who cannot solve the integral because he did not think of making the particular
substitution in that case is not sufficiently proficient at calculus; but he is
not biased against solving the integral.“ (pp. 135-136) Such
conclusion would require telepathic superpowers to be established. In most
cases, bias is defined in science as something discernible
from an external perspective (perspective of observer or a statistician) –
e.g., Malmquist bias, Signor-Lipps effect, various anthropic biases, etc. So,
while we might indeed refrain from calling the student’s lack of performance a
bias without further information, it is at least conceivable that it results from a bias, e.g., from an error in his textbook on the particular substitution, or from the teacher lacking skills in this respects, etc.
„Respondents
may be wrong about the total number of murders in Detroit and Michigan, but
these aggregate numbers are information that is of very little importance
outside government statistical offices, just as is the question Kahneman asks.“
(p. 136) Unless one is living in Detroit or in rural Michigan or considers
moving there or should judge programs of crime reduction or is deciding upon
donating to charities in Michigan or some of other zillion cases BT – similarly
as with the application of conservation of momentum and energy in driving –
conveniently downplay and/or ignore. Which in their case, I submit, is not caused
by ignorance, but by the biased view of the role of knowledge in human actions
and values. However, BT do not fail to emphasize that it is outside government statistical
offices, and not statistical offices or, say, private charity research like GiveWell or other private-sector
statisticians, who do no less statistical research than the government does.
On the
Linda experiment: „A
reasonable person may, in effect, be answering a different and broader question
that evaluates the entire situation rather than the textual question alone—for
instance, “What has the examiner designated as the correct answer?” Or “What is
the most likely answer in this experiment that I am in?”“ (p. 137)
I imagine one
should use similar heuristics in filling one’s tax forms for example – not
giving narrow and literal answers, but musing on what the government really
wishes to achieve with existing tax rates or whether it would be better for all
parties if I answer something differently, etc. The outcome of such an
experiment would certainly be wondrous! Again, it is pretty ironic that BT
ascribe such highly intelligent analysis to the very same set of subjects who
are previously excused for failing to understand logical conjunction or for not
knowing that Detroit is in Michigan.
On choices
allegedly beyond cognitive biases: „it
may be worth contrasting them against the costs of mistakes that clearly have
nothing to do with cognitive biases: the cost of choosing a profession one ends
up hating, the cost of not finding a suitable mate, the cost of having children
too early in life or too late, the cost of moving to a place one ends up
disliking, the cost of adopting a pet or sending children to a private school,
and so on.“ (p. 140) How in the world are those choices not influenced by cognitive
biases? After all, one decides about school for one’s children often on the
basis of pure confirmation bias, and the profession one ends up hating is
intuitively (if not self-evidently!) often a consequence of the temporal
horizon bias, etc.
„Kahneman’s
reliance on this model of decision making suggests that we would ideally become
more literal, abstract, out-of-context thinkers and, as such, more in line with
the neoclassical economic model, without making it clear how this would improve
the human condition.“ (p. 142) The charge is as bizarre as what was brought,
for instance, against Einstein by „Aryan physicists“ Lenard and Stark in 1930s
that the theory of relativity does not contribute to the glory of Aryan race or
obtaining the desired Lebensraum. On the Serbian scene, we have
witnessed a dumb science minister (Dragan Domazet) who urged scientists to work
„for their country instead of working for libraries“ (!). This misplaced
pragmatism – reminiscent of Lysenkoism in Soviet times – has never been a
signpost of scientific success.
On
Kahneman’s alleged revolution: „In
behavioral economics, then, we do not find the building blocks of an
alternative decision making theory that could be incorporated into a more
fruitful type of social science. In Kuhnian terms, it is not a scientific
revolution but a strange transmogrification of an old and manifestly inadequate
paradigm.“ (p. 143) While „Kuhnian terms“ should make one suspicious, it is the
idea that we should consciously strive toward „fruitfulness“ of science – even
social one! – which is really problematic. Arguably, Kuhnian view of
revolutions in science is much less important for epistemology and philosophy
of science of today than the Lakatosian notion of research programmes – and it
is exactly Kahneman’s research programme (and certainly not a revolution!)
which brought him the deserved success. Even under Kuhnian terms revolutions
are not acts of will, as BT seem to suggest in both the title and this
concluding passage – there is no perceived desire for a more fruitful kind of
science which leads to a scientific revolution. In fact, the Kuhnian account
does no good to BT’s concerns exactly because Kuhn insisted on
incommensurability of paradigms, so there could be no way to say that a new paradigm
is more or less fruitful, adequate or inadequate. Instead, as Kahneman is well
aware, only a gradual competition of research programmes and reforms following
their improvement lead to truly improved insight into problem situations.
Kahneman is no revolutionary – and he’s among the greatest for exactly
this reason.
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