Pages

12 September 2016

Kritika kritike Kanemana, 1. deo

Slaviša je ovde ukratko predstavio svoju (i Željkinu) kritiku Kanemanove knjige i celine njegovog programa. Pre svega da naglasim da je sjajno što je taj tekst objavljen, da su autori tom studijom ostvarili po svakom kriterijumu odličan naučni rezultat, da je bez ikakve sumnje hrabro kritikovati takvu veliku metu – i da im na radu iskreno čestitam. Rad je vrhunski i svako zainteresovan za teme sa ovog bloga bi dobro učinio da ga pročita. Ovde kačim svoju kritiku njihove kritike, nastalu od beležaka na marginama tokom čitanja njihovog rada. Nije poenta odbrana Kanemana – kome to svakako nije neophodno! – nego otvorena i oštra intelektualna debata o nekim od tema koje jesu i teorijski i praktično zanimljive.  
Tekst je na engleskom, iz tri razloga: (i) zato što iscrpno citira delove studije Buturović & Tasić, pa bi bilo rogobatno prebacivati svako malo sa srpskog na engleski i obratno; (ii) da bismo izbegli terminološke zađevice oko “najadekvatnijeg” prevoda nekih od korišćenih termina; (iii) iz praktičnog razloga što su i moje beleške na marginama bile na engleskom. Napisan je u relativno opuštenom stilu, bez navođenja referenci, fusnota i ostalih akademskih parafernalija. Zbog ukupne dužine podelio sam ga u dva dela.

Reform vs. counter-revolution: On Buturovic’s and Tasic’s criticism of Kahneman
Buturovic and Tasic (2015; henceforth BT) criticize Daniel Kahneman and the entire project of behavioural economy for taking too narrow concept of rationality, but also for many other perceived errors and insufficiencies. This leads into calling his work a “failed revolution”. Except for a bit of revolutionary zeal (more on that below), it is not quite clear what exactly would BT prefer from any project in behavioural economy. Kahneman’s programme is no good? Fine and well, but it’s not as if there is a glut of alternatives around. And certainly it's not as if BT criticism is, ahem, entirely rational. 
On what counts as advance: “But it does not advance our understanding of human psychology except inasmuch as one otherwise would  have been inclined to believe that people are everywhere and always “rational” in the peculiar sense in which this term is used by economists” (p. 129)
Well, how about the following hypothetical comment on Einstein's relativity: But it does not advance our understanding of physics except inasmuch as one otherwise would have been inclined to believe that physical objects are everywhere and always characterized by absolute space and time in the peculiar sense in which these terms are used by Newton and his followers. One can use this deflationary manoeuvre with equal success against each and every innovator and reformist. But the argument is rather lightweight when we reign in our revolutionary expectations and consider what is realistic to achieve in science. 

On skills and studying rationality: “One recurring issue that has cropped up since Kahneman and Tversky’s early studies of cognition has been their assumption that specific knowledge or skills are essential to rationality. Thus, the possession of statistical or factual knowledge or the use of abstract reasoning has often been uncritically taken as a standard against which we are to judge the answers that participants in the experiments give. This has attracted the critical notice of specialists but not that of the wider world.” (p. 129, emphasis MMĆ)

It is easy to show that “their assumption” can, in fact, be attributed to that slightly earlier fellow, Socrates of Athens, who – most famously in Plato’s Meno and Protagoras – argued that rational definitions of virtue must be “tethered” by knowledge, and therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the virtue can be taught to others (via specific knowledge). His famous dictum about unexamined life not worth living (ὁ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ; Apology 38a) is usually interpreted in the same manner. This has been repeated countless times in the course of Western intellectual history. Whatever intrinsic merits or demerits of the assumption, it is ahistoric and naive (to say the least) to attribute it to Kahneman and Tversky as a sort of newfangled behavioural fad. BTW, how do BT know that a particular standard related to a particular experiment has been accepted uncritically – as contrasted with the situation in which such standard were accepted after much reflection, deliberation, hand-wringing, and going to-and-fro? What is factual evidence for uncritical acceptance of such standards? If there is some such evidence, BT fail to provide it.

Besides, what exactly is the alternative to this millennia-old assumption? That rationality could be (non-circularly) defined without reference to any particular knowledge or skills? It would be interesting to see results of such an enterprise. In any case, the burden of proof lies on BT, and not on Kahneman or anyone else who accepts that particular forms and amounts of knowledge or skills are necessary for any operational concept of rationality.

A long debate – more than a century – in evolutionary biology on the subject of extinction of species ended in conclusion that it is illegitimate to cite inferiority of a species or a higher taxon as the cause for extinction without listing which characters in what context were inferior to analogous characters in surviving taxons. Before we reached that stage, gradualist (il)logic filled textbooks with statements like “dinosaurs went extinct and mammals survived because dinosaurs were inferior”; which, of course, was not empirically supported whatsoever and in the end got reduced to “they had to be inferior in some unspecified way, since they went extinct”. Evolutionary biology and paleontology flourished greatly after getting rid of such nonsense. And there are many similar examples in other areas.

Finally, what exactly should this attention and critical notice “of the wider world”, so lacking in the reception of Kahneman’s work, consist of? Should Kahneman complain that he hasn’t been a guest of The Kardashians yet? Is his work less valuable due to the fact that he has 6,966 twitter followers, in comparison to N zillions of Justin Bieber? In my view the very concept of the “critical notice... of the wider world” is oxymoronic, since critical notice is not something established by a show of hands or a plebiscite, and almost by definition “the wider world” is too heterogeneous for any non-trivial critical notice. And the oxymoron is only strengthened – in a surreal kind of way – if we accept BT’s implication that empirical knowledge or reasoning skills are not truly necessary for demonstration of rationality; BT seemingly expect the same “wider world” which they excuse for lacking knowledge and reasoning skills to offer (presuming rational) criticism of Kahneman. Tall order, if anything.

On the language analogy: „We use language for a purpose, and grammar is an integral part of language.“ (p. 129) So it is natural to expect an intuitive and automatic access to grammar. What is wrong with this statement is clearly seen from an analogous statement, for example: We use mathematics for a purpose, and complex analysis is an integral part of mathematics. Therefore, intuitive and automatic access to complex analysis should not surprise us. Of course, that is absurd. Perhaps a two or three greatest geniuses in mathematics, persons born once per century, could conceivably have intuitive access to complex analysis, but that certainly does not apply to millions (or indeed billions) of users of mathematics. And BT have neither demonstrated that, conversely, the lack of grammar skills characterizing billions of people demand explanation, not have they shown any evidence that their preference for linguistic over mathematical skills reflects anything else then their own personal preference.

This conclusion is strengthened by their continuation and generalization of the same theme: „Statistics, on the other hand, is a body of knowledge created, systematized, and formalized by statisticians.“ (p. 130) I find this simply untrue. Like any other mathematical discipline, statistics is a set of proposition whose validity is given quite independently of statisticians and its statements would be entirely valid if suddenly all statisticians in the world were to die tomorrow or even if there were no statisticians whatsoever. Unless one is an extreme postmodern social constructivist, the statement that, for instance, any probability distribution on the set of real numbers R has at least one median will be true anywhere and at any time, even in the universes with no life and therefore no statisticians. (Of course, standard definitions of terms such as probability distribution or median is assumed.)

„Stating that people are good or bad at statistical reasoning tells us something about their knowledge of and talent for this particular skill and not much else.“ (p. 130) So, how exactly does this differ from claiming that stating that people are good or bad at grammar tells us something about their knowledge of and talent for this particular language skill and not much else? I do not see much of a difference; on the contrary, to paraphrase the authors, statements like these tell us something about their personal ordering of preferences and not much else.

The parable of a physicist: „A passionate physicist without much interest in the outside world could observe that people are very good at manipulating objects but embarrassingly inept at solving problems in theoretical mechanics. Few of us would treat such a statement as evidence that people should gain more knowledge of theoretical mechanics or that they are irrational when they get questions about the subject wrong. We would, instead, conclude that this physicist is making an oddly self-absorbed comparison between knowledge of physics and the ability to operate in the physical world.“ (p. 130)

This is either false or misleading on so many different levels that it is difficult to decide where to begin. For starters, the parable misses the entire envisioned goal: if the goal is set to make people better at manipulating objects, one is entirely entitled to argue that increased knowledge of theoretical mechanics might well help. Which has, by the way, been accepted long ago in sports academies around the world, whose curricula contra BT contain important elements from theoretical mechanics. If the goal of decision theory is to help make better decisions, the analogy holds. Second, in the course of a single paragraph, BT make leap from descriptive to prescriptive stance and back, while pretending to offer a parable from a neutral point of view. Third, if something is “embarrassing”, then clearly there is an opportunity cost to remove the embarrassment by – what a surprise! – gaining more knowledge of the subject, be it theoretical mechanics or Sinhalese syntax or whatever.

The irony is particularly rich when one takes into account that it comes from the same authors who subsequently take Kahneman to task for allegedly providing misleading cues in Linda and other psychological experiments. The number of misleading cues in this passage sets the record for packing density. What else could be the role of such strings of words as „without much interest in the outside world“ or „embarrassingly inept“ or „few of us would treat“ (rhetorical device known since at least Cicero and abused by perhaps every single politician on the planet) or „oddly self-absorbed“ if not providing misleading cues for the reader? „Oddly self-absorbed“ in contrast to – what exactly? Perhaps „commonly self-absorbed“ manner permeating comparisons made by social scientists? (Merriam-Webster offers „common“ as the first-choice antonym to „odd“.) Why is it important that the physicist is „passionate“ and not some boring old bureaucrat? Obviously, framing matters, as Kahneman and Tversky knew and BT confirm (p. 134).

„Statistical skills, unlike physical ones, could be somewhat useful in an ordinary person’s everyday life.“ (p. 130) The logical implication here is that physical skills could not be somewhat useful in an ordinary person’s everyday life, and such general statement is easily disproved by citing even a single counterexample in which physical skills could – and indeed are – very useful in an ordinary person’s everyday life. Such example is, for instance, driving – we have not evolved to drive cars, we do have big problems in properly accounting for conservation of momentum and energy in driving, and there is every indication – since there is no actual research done on this issue – that knowledge of theoretical mechanics is useful in driving (it is used, for instance, in instructions for defensive driving, of course in a simplified form). The example is not mine, it was suggested long ago by Richard Feynman, who was called many things but never “self-absorbed”.

A charitable interpretation of this is that the authors tried to say that the probability measure of cases in which physical skills are important is much smaller than the analogous probability measure for statistics, but such framing would (a) be less flashy, and (b) require at least hinting at some metric at which their personal intuitions about relative usefulness could be justified. But if they wished to convey that meaning, they should have chosen their words more carefully, especially since the context is set by their relentless revolutionary criticism (more on this below) of framings and contexts and backgrounds provided by behavioural economists and decision theorists. For all they who take the sword, etc.

The argument from billions: “But how useful these skills might be is unclear, as billions of people somehow manage to make their way in the world, decade after decade, despite their complete ignorance of statistics.“ (p. 130) Oh, but how useful reading and writing skills might be is unclear as well, as billions of people somehow manage to make their way in the world, decade after decade, despite their illiteracy – and have done so for many millennia. Unclear, indeed.

“Base rates are not unequivocally given to us as stable and known, and the appropriateness of using or disregarding them in particular situations depends on a host of conditions.” (pp. 131-132) Now, this rhetorical stratagem can again be debunked by comparing it to an analogous statement, for instance: Rules of grammar are not unequivocally given to us as stable and known, and the appropriateness of using or disregarding them in particular situations depends on a host of conditions. Sounds right, doesn’t it? After all, there are billions upon billions of people who hardly regard rules of grammar as “stable and known”. And we are still no closer to understanding what exact difference there is between information encoded in base rates and information encoded in the rules of grammar.

On Tom W.: “Only those few subjects (if any) in the third group who had studied the distribution of graduate students by field would have had reason to put any confidence in their guesswork about the matter.“ (p. 133) Again, let us compare this with a linguistic example. Consider the frequency distribution of letters in a language. While few subjects – if any – in a given group may know that e is the most frequent letter in any representative English text, this does not mean that they are really agnostic or have uniform prior distribution of frequency over the set of letters. It is hardly conceivable that even the most linguistically challenged or even illiterate and low-IQ experimental subject will have doubts whether a is more frequent English letter than q, or will give x the benefit of doubt versus s. Contrary to the implication of BT, normative knowledge is not measured by insight into a given database, but by success rate of inferential processes.

„Subjects asked to provide their “best guesses” about something they have probably never thought about before—the proportion of U.S. graduate students in various fields“ (p. 133) – where subjects are not farmers or soldiers or schoolchildren or pensioners but graduate students themselves, who are moving in the environment of other grad students and are perfectly well aware that the fields and departments are unequal in size and scope, are likely to think much about grad schools, etc. etc. If such knowledge should not be regarded as normative for the given population, what should be, according to the authors? Lack of curiosity? Unreflecting indifference? Low IQ?

“Kahneman and Tversky seem to think it is more rational to use made-up statistics than good heuristics.“ (p. 133) And believing the researcher – in psychological experiments where researchers standardly lie and mislead their subjects (e.g. Asch conformity or even Milgram) – is somehow a good heuristics? What kind of normative knowledge prescribed that? Perhaps the Orwellian stipulation that „ignorance is strength“?

22 comments:

Steve W said...

Razvila se zucna diskusija....

Slaviša Tasić said...

Milane, hvala na sistematičnom čitanju rada i odvojenom vremenu za pisanje ovakve kritike. Počastvovan sam!

Moj utisak nakon čitanja oba dela je da se radi više o nizu primedbi nego o jedinstvenoj i celovitoj kritici. Možda je i naša kritika Kanemana takva (jer je, dobrim delom, i njegovo delo takvo), pa se onda ovo perpetuira. Ali ipak smo probali da našu kritiku organizujemo oko nekoliko glavnih poenti -- a one su:

1) da je Kaneman, misleću da kritikuje model racionalnog izbora, isti ustvari ustoličio. Proglasio je taj model za normativan, za ideal racionalnosti, a sva odstupanja od njega neracionalnostima.

2) da Kaneman (i dobar deo ostatka bihevioralne ekonomije (nadalje BE)) neracionalnost brkaju sa neznanjem. U nekoliko eksperimenata K. i drugi učesnicima učitavaju neracionalnost, ali mi tvrdimo da greške učesnika češće počivaju na nedovoljnoj informisanosti ili nedostatku ekspertize.

Povezano s tim, postoje i drugi razlozi zbog kojeg eksperimenti ne pokazuju neracionalnost koju tvrde da pokazuju (nedostatak motivacije, izbor reči kod upitnika, situacija), kojima su se razni autori ranije bavili ali to uglavnom ostaje manje zapaženo.

3) Eksperimenti ove vrste imaju ograničeni domet. Organizovani su oko stvari koje su obuhvatljive i merljive, a zanemaruju druge i važnije. Ovde je posebno važna razlika između pristrasnosti (bias) i grešaka (mistake). Bias je kada pogrešimo za 0.25% u proceni budućih kamata na kredite (jer smo, na primer, neosnovano optimistični). Mistake je kada odlučimo da kupimo kuću a kasnije shvatimo da nije trebalo. Bias je merljiv jer je uporediv sa stvarno postojećom kamatom, mistake nije jer ne postoji objektivno merilo. Greške su neouporedivo važnije od pristrasnosti, ali se društvene nauke bave pristrasnostima jer su obuhvatljivi, merljivi i rezultati se mogu objaviti. Kaneman i cela BE bave se pristrasnostima, danas svi od država do akademija do Nobelovih komiteta misle da je to najvažnija stvar, ali je to opasno. Na primer -- velika finansijska kriza iz 2008. nije izbila jer je neko bio pristrasan u proceni rizika, već što su glavni rizici bili potpuno izgubljeni iz vida!

To su glavne poente, za koje mislim da nisu ubedljivo osporene. Osvrnuću se i na neke pojedinačne primedbe ali za to će trebati više odvojenih komentara.

Slaviša Tasić said...

Sada ću polako po tačkama, Milanovi citati su na engleskom, moji odgovori ispod na srpskom.

"On what counts as advance: ...

Well, how about the following hypothetical comment on Einstein's relativity: But it does not advance our understanding of physics except inasmuch as one otherwise would have been inclined to believe that physical objects are everywhere and always characterized by absolute space and time in the peculiar sense in which these terms are used by Newton and his followers. One can use this deflationary manoeuvre with equal success against each and every innovator and reformist. But the argument is rather lightweight when we reign in our revolutionary expectations and consider what is realistic to achieve in science."

Poređenje ne stoji. Fizika otkriva i formalizuje prirodne zakone; ekonomija racionalnog izbora je konstrukt. Problem kod Kahnemana je što se uzima da on kritikuje taj konstrukt. U stvarnosti on model racionalnog izbora ustoličava, implicitno ga proglašava za poželjni, normativni model ponašanja. Onda nalazi praktična odstupanja od modela i to progrlašava neracionalnostima.

"On skills and studying rationality:
...
It is easy to show that “their assumption” can, in fact, be attributed to that slightly earlier fellow, Socrates of Athens..."

Jeste, pitanje razdvojenosti znanja i racionalnosti je staro. Može se govoriti o suvoj, formalnoj racionalnosti, koja ne zahteva nikakvo znanje nego samo konzistentnost, a može i o substantivnoj koja zahteva znanje za dobre odluke. Ni ekonomisti nemaju samo jednu definiciju, imaju neke osnovne formalističke (e.g. tranzitivnost preferencija), a imaju i neke ekstremno substantivne ("rational expectations"). Kod Kanemana je (generalno, pošto eksperimenti su razni) problem što se navodno bavi jednom, a ustvari ispituje drugu. On misli da ispituje formalnu racionalnost, a ustvari postavi pitanje koje zahteva stvarno znanje. I kad ispitanik ne odgovori na to pitanje, onda tvrdi da je to problem racionalnosti a ne znanja.

"Finally, what exactly should this attention and critical notice “of the wider world”, so lacking in the reception of Kahneman’s work, consist of? Should Kahneman complain that he hasn’t been a guest of The Kardashians yet? Is his work less valuable due to the fact that he has 6,966 twitter followers, in comparison to N zillions of Justin Bieber?"

To si pogrešno razumeo (ili mi nismo jasno napisali): tu kažemo nešto potpuno obratno, da su specijalisti kritikovali Kanemana, ali wider world nije. ("This has attracted the critical notice of specialists but not that of the wider world." A i pod time wider world mislimo na širu intelektualnu publiku, ništa masovno. Kanemana su u ovome kritikovali kognitivni psiholozi ("specialists"), ali ekonomisti, sociolozi, novinari, itd. ("wider world") to nisu primetili.

Milan Ćirković said...

OK, za sad da odgovorim na ovo poslednje, pa cu se vratiti na ponesto od gore. Meni je zaista cudno da *bilo ko* ocekuje da ce se "wider world" oglasiti na bilo sta sto nisu Kardashiani ili Justin Bieber. Pa ni ovi javni/jadni intelektualci tipa Krugmana ne dobijaju ni delic publiciteta koji prizeljkuju, a za Kahnemana koji je za jedno osam kategorija ozbiljniji onda to mora a fortiori da vazi, zar ne?

Slaviša Tasić said...

Ključna reč koju ispustaš je "critical": "This has attracted the CRITICAL notice of specialists but not that of the wider world." Poenta je da KRITIKA Kanemana nije prodrla u javnost, već se zaustavila na specijalistima.

O Kanemanu kažemo potpuno suprotno na početku teksta: on je izuzetno popularan, koliko naučnik može da bude. Šira javnost (po našem shvatanju, imajuću u vidu temu, to je intelektualna javnost -- recimo čitaoci NY Timesa, ne navijači banjičkog Rada) je o njegovom pozitivnom doprinosu itekako obaveštena. Međutim, neki od njegovih nalaza su snažno kritikovani od strane specijalista (uglavnom psihologa), ali to nije dospelo u intelektualnu javnost izvan specijalizovanih akademskih časopisa. Kolumnisti NY Timesa proglasili su ga legendom, a nisu svesni takvih odavno postojećih kritika koje citiramo.

Slaviša Tasić said...

"On the language analogy..."

Dakle mi kritikujemo Kanemanovu analogiju, kažemo da ona ne stoji. U pitanju su dve skroz različite veštine, jedna se razvije spontano kroz praksu (gramatika), druga se nauči. Jednu koristimo svaki dan (gramatiku), drugu (statistiku) ogromna većina ljudi koristi vrlo retko ili nikad. Kaneman primećuje da ljudi nisu tako dobri u statistici kao u gramatici; mi kažemo da to nema veze. Ti tvrdiš da statistički zakoni u prirodi postoje nezavisno od statističara koji ih pronalaze i imenuju i to je tačno, ali ne vidim kako utiče na našu poentu i kako čini analogiju boljom. Sa stanovišta ljudskog uma, gramatika i statistika su i dalje potpuno različite stvari.


"The parable of a phyicist." ...
"The irony is particularly rich when one takes into account that it comes from the same authors who subsequently take Kahneman to task for allegedly providing misleading cues in Linda and other psychological experiments. The number of misleading cues in this passage sets the record for packing density."

Možda i jeste ironija, ali ti u nastavku potvrđuješ da jezički framing postoji i da je važan. Čak i ako smo i mi krivi, to ne radi u korist Kanemana.

...
Such example is, for instance, driving – we have not evolved to drive cars, we do have big problems in properly accounting for conservation of momentum and energy in driving, and there is every indication – since there is no actual research done on this issue – that knowledge of theoretical mechanics is useful in driving (it is used, for instance, in instructions for defensive driving, of course in a simplified form).

Znanje teoretske mehanike pomaže u vožnji? Neka je i Feynman rekao, ali ovo je smešno. Ima na Quori pitanje "What skills does it take to be a Formula One racing driver?" sa odgovorima nekih specijalista i teoretsku mehaniku ne pominje niko.

"On Tom W."
“Kahneman and Tversky seem to think it is more rational to use made-up statistics than good heuristics.“ (p. 133) And believing the researcher – in psychological experiments where researchers standardly lie and mislead their subjects (e.g. Asch conformity or even Milgram) – is somehow a good heuristics? What kind of normative knowledge prescribed that? Perhaps the Orwellian stipulation that „ignorance is strength“?"

Meni izgleda kao prirodna pretpostavka da me researcher ne laže. To je dobra heuristika inače u životu, ne znam kako bi svet funkcionisao kada bismo sve što čujemo tretirali kao kanemanovske trikove i zagonetke. Ispitanici, što se mene tiče racionalno, ne sumnjaju u sve što im se kaže. Kanemanovi i slični eksperimenti tu naivnost zgodno upotrebe da je prevedu i neracionalnost.

Ovde sam mislim završio sa glavnim tačkama iz prvog dela. Ponoviću ono što sam napisao u prvom komentaru -- nekako ne vidim zajedničku nit u ovoj kritici. Ovo je niz primedbi na naše primere ili na način na koje smo nešto rekli, ali ne znam kako sve to zajedno brani Kanemana ili podriva kritiku.

Milan Ćirković said...

"Poređenje ne stoji. Fizika otkriva i formalizuje prirodne zakone; ekonomija racionalnog izbora je konstrukt."
Ja i dalje ne vidim tu apsolutno nikakvu razliku. Mi ne znamo - niti mozemo da znamo - sta je to "prirodno" u metafizickom smislu. Moguce je da je citav svemir simulacija na racunaru supernapredne civilizacije. Moguce je da ono sto percipiramo kao prirodne procese zapravo predstavljaju intencionalne akcije Gospoda Boga ili naprednih vanzemaljaca. Fizika se emancipovala od metafizike prilicno davno i ona ispituje *strukturu* necega bez da ulazi u pitanja aristotelovskog finalnog uzroka. Ako je to nesto konstrukt - so what?? Ono i dalje ima strukturu, regularnosti, merljive karakteristike, evolucionu trajektoriju, itd. isl.

Dakle, ako postoji problem sa analogijom, on ne moze lezati u naturalizmu.

I da, naravno da razumevanje odrzanja mehanicke energije i impulsa (sto je deo teorijske mehanike) pomaze u voznji. Meni je to najprirodnije i najintuitivnije moguce. Ako vi imate drugaciju intuiciju, fine and well -- ali nemojte da svoju intuiciju prodajete kao opstu i ociglednu stvar. Opet ti kazem - pogledaj udzbenike sa sportskih akademija i u njima ces naci mnogo stvari iz teorijske mehanike, koje se ne moraju nuzno zvati tim imenom, ali *to jesu*.

Milan Ćirković said...

Treba da dodam da je i tvrdnja da "fizika otkriva i formalizuje prirodne zakone" epistemoloski jako sporna. Ima jedan broj filozofa nauke koji odista veruje u to (recimo Tim Maudlin), ali cenim da je to manjina i da je medju samim fizicarima broj ljudi koji tako sagledavaju praksu fizike jako, jako mali. Problem je sto retko ko veruje da su "prirodni zakoni" ista vise ili jace od generalizacije kojim se umesto jako mnogo partikularnih, izrice jedna opsta tvrdnja, a partikularne se jedine odnose na *realne* fizicke procese. Tako da je na neki nacin default pozicija fizicara (a, kao sto rekoh, i vecine filozofa fizike i epistemologa) da su prirodni zakoni samo kompaktan zapis mnogo instanci naseg iskustva. Te shodno tome mogu biti formalizovani (mada nije nuzno, ima ih i koji nemaju formalni zapis), ali tesko da mogu biti otkriveni u uobicajenom znacenju te reci. Samim tim, obzirom da i sa konstruktima mozemo imati i odista imamo iskustva, koja je cesto nuzno kompaktno zapisati, nema nikakvog razloga zasto ne bismo govorili o zakonima ekonomije ili psihologije, naravno u slicnom deflatornom i oslabljenom obliku.

jouissance said...

Moram da reagujem na ucenje gramatike kao sponatano, sa napomenom da nemam ni najblazu ideju ko su Kaneman i ostali akteri u ovoj prepisci, ali sam svesna uticaja BE (meni to izgleda kao entertainment science, ali nije bitno)

Gramatika se ne uci sponatano, posebno ako pri tome mislimo na gramatiku maternjeg jezika.
Setite se kako su vas ucili jezik roditelji, ili kako ste vi ucili svoju decu. Svakako niste objasnjavali sta je subjekat, a sta predikat u recenici, pa ih onda terali da ta pravila primenjuju na razlicite primere. Ili ih niste naucili da nabroje padeze, pa da onda prave recenice u kojima padezi uredjuju odnose izmedju reci.

Gramaticka pravila se usvajaju sponatano, najcesce bez eksplicitnih usvajanja gramatickih meta-pravila. Deca jezik koriste relativno ili sasvim 'pravilno' pre nego sto u skoli nauce da uopste postoji rec padez.

Mislim da je pitanje analogije sa statistikom vrlo zanimljivo, ali ne i pravilno upotrebljeno (ili sam ja sitniciva). Ako deci damo da igraju jamb ili ih naucimo preferans, ili neke video igrice cija se strategija zasniva jednim delom na primeni statistike i znanju osnovnih matematickih operacija, to bi bilo spontana primena pravila, sa vecom ili manjom greskom u procenama.

Pitanje: da li bi moglo da se ocekuje da deca vidno bolje igraju te igre nakon perioda svakodnevne vezbe, bez usvajanja formula/pravila statistike?

Ako je odgovor ne, tu je jos jedna razlika u odnosu na maternji jezik: uz citanje, koriscenje i izlozenost raznovrsnim diskursima, a bez znanja gramatike kao eksplicitno formulisaih pravilnosti, izuzetaka i ostalih konvencija, dete ce "bolje" govoriti, a verovatno i bolje pisati.

Znam da odgovor sigurno ne moze biti sasvim kategorican, posto je dramaticna razlika da li je spil velicine od 8 karata ili 52. Ja ne vidim dovoljno dobru analogiju ovome u jeziku.

Jezik se usvaja bukvalno od rodjenja (slusanjem), i celog zivota neprestano koristi. Meni se uvek cinilo da matematika (i samim tim statistika) imaju znatno manji uticaj te vrste - sto ne znaci da mislim da nema matematike u zivotno upotrebnom smislu; naprotiv. Koristan odgovor BE bi po meni bio na pitanje na koji nacin je najbolje pribliziti usvajanje statistike usvajanju jezika (ne ucenju!), tako da se bias smanji?


I da, primer sa verovatnocom pojave glasa e u engleskom nije nikakvo pitanje znanja gramatike niti cak upotrebe jezika, vec samo neke intuitivne statistike.

Boris Strunjaš said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Boris Strunjaš said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Boris Strunjaš said...

Blogger Boris Strunjaš said...
Milane

Solidna rasprava se prije koju godinu vodila na facebooku zidu astrofizicara Dejana Vinkovica o tome da li filozofi mogu doprinjeti modernoj nauci. Višnja Maudlin je pisala i objašnjavala da itekako mogu, nastupala je sa slicne pozicije kao Tim, baš u vezi ovoga što ste pomenuli za fiziku i Pavel Gregorić, dok je Boris Lenhard zagovarao to stanovište da ne mogu, kao i Vinkovic. Sve je krenulo posle kritike Krausove knjige od strane filozofa. Generalno Boris Lenhard godinama vrti istu priču, pošto po njemu filozofi nauke u pogledu mol. biologije zaostaju 20-30 godina. Nikako da shvati da se i mol. biolozi mogu baviti filozofijom biologije, kao što je evol. biolog i zoolog Mayr. Pogledajte:

https://symblogia.wordpress.com/2012/05/07/filozofija-i-znanost/

https://symblogia.wordpress.com/2012/05/14/filozofija-i-znanost-ii-gost-post/

https://symblogia.wordpress.com/2012/06/12/filozofija-i-znanost-iii/

Boris Strunjaš said...

Milane

Zanima me kad ste već pomenuli Maudlina i njegovu spornu poziciju u vezi toga šta nam fizika otkriva, koliko danas ima smisla Hajekova hipoteza iz njegove knjige posvećene Poperu "Studije iz filozofije, politike i ekonomije" u kojoj razmatrajući odnos izmedju fenomena koje proučavaju fizika i ekonomija, dolazi na ideju da bi mozda i fizika u budućnosti na mikro nivou mogla da se susretne sa fenomenima koji su kompleksni, pa bi njena evolucija išla od jednostavnih ka kompleksnim? Hajek kritikuje induktivizam i redukcionizam i zaključuje da zbog slabije eksplanatorne moći ekonomija nije ništa manje naučna već da je napredak dosta sporiji.

Milan Ćirković said...

@jouissance
"Gramatika se ne uci sponatano, posebno ako pri tome mislimo na gramatiku maternjeg jezika."
Nemam nista protiv toga, zapravo cenim da je to sto kazete blize Kanemanovom nego Zeljkinom & Slavisinom stanovistu.

"Koristan odgovor BE bi po meni bio na pitanje na koji nacin je najbolje pribliziti usvajanje statistike usvajanju jezika (ne ucenju!), tako da se bias smanji?"
Upravo tako, dakle Kanemanov istrazivacki program (a ne revolucija!) ima perspektivu da odgovori na to pitanje, dok ozbiljnije alternative nismo videli *osim negiranja da bias postoji ili da je relevantan*.

"primer sa verovatnocom pojave glasa e u engleskom nije nikakvo pitanje znanja gramatike niti cak upotrebe jezika, vec samo neke intuitivne statistike."
Ja se izvinjavam ako sam bio nejasan, jasno je da primer nema nikakve veze sa *gramatikom*. Ali sa upotrebom jezika? Pa da li je onaj Mogli iz dzungle koji nije mnogo koristio jezik ako su ga odgajale zivotinje (ili, ako hocete realisticnije primere, zatvorenici koji su proveli decenije po samicama) zaista bio u identicnoj situaciji da oceni koja su slova cesca, a koja redja nego neko od nas koji koristimo jezik neprekidno? Ne bih rekao. Takodje ovo drugo tacka sporenja - odakle tacno potice "intuitivnost statistike"? Zasto bi intuitivnost statistike u vezi sa frekvencijom slova bila nuzno jaca nego intuitivnost odnosa broja farmera i bibliotekara, kako impliciraju Zeljka & Slavisa?

Milan Ćirković said...

@Boris
Hvala na ovim linkovim vezanim za Vinkovica, pogledacu, on je sjajan tip generalno, mada se sigurno ne slazemo u svemu! E, a sto se tice Hayekove knjige o Popperu, ja apsolutno smatram da je on tu bio na pravom tragu, cak bi se obzirom na vreme pojave te knjige i novija kretanja u fizici mogao smatrati prorocanskim (bez obzira koliko bi njemu licno takav epitet bio stran!) Ja sam, kao sto napisah gore u odgovoru Slavisi, u potpunosti na stanovistu da je "sve u metodu", tj. da je potpuno epistemoloski nevazno da li se proucavaju naturalisticki sistemi ili konstrukti, mada naravno prakseoloski postoje razlike u kapacitetima i sijaset drugih stvari koje ponekad usporavaju napredak u jednoj, a ubrzavaju u drugoj oblasti, isl.

Boris Strunjaš said...

Milan

Jeste Vinković odlican, naravno, mada daleko manje i on i Lenhard( Lenhard je stvarno vrhunski naučnik, ali imali su u Hrvatskoj uvijek ekstra dobrih mol. biologa Radman, Stagljar, pa i Djikic, on je završio medicinski) poznaju filozofiju nauke od vas. Vinkoviceva je kritika generalno više usmjerena na ogromnu zastupljenost profesora sa društvenih nauka( pogotovo sa filozofskog i kvazi smjerova) kada je u pitanju sve vezano za nauku u Hrvatskoj. Mnogo više smeća od naučnih radova se pablikuje u društvenim naukama, iskreno ne može se svako nazivati naucnikom, tako da se dosta i slažem sa njim, bar kada je doprinos u pitanju, pa makar imali i blaže kriterijume. Nije Vinković protiv ekonomije, pa sa ekonomistom Vukom Vukovicem je stvorio matematički model za predviđanje izbora, naravno uzimajući u obzir predkcijsku moć matematičkih modela u ekonomiji i politici, i s obzirom na ogroman broj promenljivih. Čak su bili dosta uspjesni.

http://oraclum.eu/

http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/znanstvenici-vinkovic-sikic-i-vukovic-za-index-zasto-su-nasa-predvidjanja-izbora-tocnija-od-ostalih/917404.aspx

A što se tiče Hayeka i filozofije nauke, Popper je više rekao o njemu u njihovim pismima:" I think I have learnt more from you than from any other living thinker, except perhaps Alfred Tarski"( Popper to Hayek, 15 March 1944, quoted in Hacohen 2000, p.486).

Boris Strunjaš said...

Šteta što se poruke na blogu ne mogu korigovati, pa moram da ih brisem, pošto mi se rijeci preslikavaju na tabletu:-)

Boris Strunjaš said...

Milane, Slavisa

Jeste procitali talebov tekst o "The intellectual Yet idiot"?

https://medium.com/@nntaleb/the-intellectual-yet-idiot-13211e2d0577?source=user_profile---------3-

Samo i on je upao u slicne zablude pa je u istu kvazinteketualni kontejner ubacio i neke stvari kojima tu nije mjesto.

Slaviša Tasić said...

Jesam, Taleba ne propustam. Ne treba sve što kaže shvatati doslovno (recimo stvari poput "deadlifting"), ali generalni stav mu je dobar. I preko potreban, zlata vredan danas u vreme tehnokratskog elitizma, čak i kad u nekim konkretnim stvarima nije u pravu. Ili kad se ponaša kao kreten.

Pretpostavljam da Milan ima drugačije mišljenje.

Milan Ćirković said...

Poznato je da je dobar deo boljsevika i inih "korisnih idiota" koji su doveli kataklizmu komunizma na vlast u Rusiji (a potom i ogromnom delu ostatka sveta) bio iz redova aristokratije. Ostali su bili uglavnom advokati, profesori, srednja klasa. Najmanje je medju njima bilo radnika, a seljaka nije bilo moguce sa fenjerom pronaci. Do cega je to dovelo, cca. 100 miliona mrtvih, koncentracioni logori, prinudna preseljenja, holodomori, generacije upropascene, itd. isl. videli smo. I naravno, rezultovalo je time da su siroke mase radnistva i seljastva, u cije ime je taj monstruozni totalitarizam uveden, bile u jos zescoj obespravljenosti nego sto je bio slucaj ranije.

E sad, samo promenimo vrstu kapitala iz finansijskog u kulturni a la Bourdieu, pa cemo imati slicnu sliku. Da ne bi ispalo da pricam kao intelektualac, preci cu na "narodski", na cemu se unapred izvinjavam, ali takvo je ovo nase doba tehnokratskog elitizma, govori da te ceo svet razume: dakle, kad vidim da intelektualci (pa bili oni Taleb ili Chomsky ili Sowell ili Slavisa ;p) seru po intelektualnoj eliti, a samim tim i po sebi, prilicno sam uveren da to vodi u novo totalitarno sranje u kojem ce, naravno, opet najvise da najebu one siroke mase zarad cije dobrobiti se to navodno radi...

Boris Strunjaš said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Boris Strunjaš said...

Milan

Mogu da prihvatim da on kritikuje, marksiste, lijeve feministe, postmoderniste, kulturne antropologe koji kao i neki psiholozi zanemaruju biologiju, ekonomiste, koji misle da makroekonomijom mogu predvidjeti krize itd. Takvih ima na univerzitetima i zaslužuju kritiku.

Ali da covjek napiše ove besmislice za GMO, stvarno smijesno. Zatim piše kako su IYI nekada mislili jedno a sad drugo? Ispade kao da on nikada nije promijenilo mišljenje. Zatim piše kako IYI znaju šta je dobro za malog covjeka? Ima ludaka medju političarima koji bi se mijesali u svaki aspekt ljudskog života, ali ima i ozbiljnih intelektualaca koji znaju mnogo više o globalnim problemima nego prosječan covjek i koji se ne mešaju već ukazuju kako treba reagovati, evo ekolozi o uništenju prirode na primer.

On poredi mišićni katabolizam izazvan deadliftom, jer kači slike po facebooku kako diže tegove sa intelektualnim katabolizam i objašnjava kako se ishranom jednostavno izlazi iz mišićnog katabolizam dok to nije tako lako sa intelektualnim. Međutim najveći je problem što je on duboko u intelektualnom katabolizamu, da li zbog previse votke sa Rusima ili ko zna čega to ne znam. Pa ljudi nikad manje nego u našem vremenu nisu slušali intelektualce koje bi svakako trebali slusati jer je znanje dostupnije nego ikada u istoriji, usled čega imamo ekspanziju raznih homeopata, antivakcinasa, alternativnih ljekara koji krive vakcine za autizam, protivnika GMO itd. Sa ovim tekstom me podsjetio na depresivnog Fojerbanda, koji ukaže na neke stvari smisleno, a zatim se izlupa maksimalno kad kaže da o nauci trebaju odlučivati obični laici jer oni nemaju ništa manje znanje od naučnika i tako pokušava idealizovati demokratiju koja je trula da ne može trulija biti.