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09 March 2010

Tri zanimljiva teksta

1. Post Džejmija Vajta o reformisanju izbornog sistema.
2. Akademska autobiografija Judžina Fame, vodećih finansijskog ekonomiste.
3. Esej Grega Menkjua na temu moralnosti poreske politike.

6 comments:

Željka Buturović said...

ne slazem se sa ovom hipotetickom reformom izbornog sistema. poznato je da su bolje informisani biraci ekstremniji od neobavestenih. i meni cesto smeta ulagivanje medijanskom biracu, ali on stavlja kocnice na "pametne" ideje radikalnih transformatora. u velikom broju slucajeva, to je pozitivna stvar.

uzgred, nije jasno zasto bi se slucajno birali biraci, koji onda biraju senatore. zasto se senatori i kongresmeni direktno ne bi birali na lutriji? ako cemo sve da izvrnemo na glavacke, sto bi izborne jedinice bile svetinja.

ponajvise, ne vidim da je americkoj demokratiji potrebna reforma. iz liberalne perspektive, najveca vrednost americke demokratije je u sustini proceduralna - u podeli vlasti a i u beskonacnom komplikovanim procedurama u svim granama, a narocito zakonodavnoj. to drasticno usporava i blokira gomilu "briljantnih" ideja raznih prosvetljenih strucnjaka.

Brut said...

Iako je tekst predloga izbornih reformi, koji je Marko linkovao, u sustini samo proizvod snobovske potrebe za intelektualnim igrarijama i hokus-pokus-preparandusima, ne mislim da je predlog sasvim bizaran, ili je bar jednako nakaradan kao i problem koji zeli da resi - paradoks (reprezentativne) demokratije. Princip demokratije kaze da svako ima pravo da bira i da bude biran, sto predstavlja pravni i logicki nonsens i moralnu rugobu od principa, a i u startu narusava drugi princip - do kojeg je stalo liberalima - nacelo podele vlasti. Ako je narod, tj. njegova volja, zakonodavac, on ne moze biti i izvrsilac svoje volje. Potpuno dosledno sproveden ovaj princip narusio bi princip reprezentativnosti (neposredna demokratija). Otuda i ona prica o demokratskom totalitarizmu ili demokratiji kao najgorem despotizmu. (U americkoj demokratiji je najbolja stvar to sto ne radi, tj. sto ima gomilu kocnica i protivteza koje su mudro postavili Ocevi utemeljivaci kako bi joj onemogucili da se ispolji u punoj snazi.) E sad, paradoks je manji sto je manji broj onih koji vladaju - i sto vise idemo od demokratije ka monarhistickom principu - to takva vladavina savrsenije ispunjava uslov reprezentativnosti, zakonitija je, pa i liberalnija. Monarhija je otuda oblik vladavine koji je najvise u skladu sa idejom vladavine prava, ako posmatramo princip reprezentativnosti.

Pomenuti predlog je zanimljiv iz jos jednog ugla - "volja naroda" je podredjena "slucaju" ili "bozijoj volji", sta se kome vec svidja. To je jako vazan element, koji treba istaci, jer i princip prirodnog prava, za koji se zalazu liberali, pociva na odbacivanju pavlovljevsko-avgustinovskog principa "cesaru cesarevo-Bogu bozije" i uspostavljanju iustitia universalis. Prirodno-pravna teorija, nije moguca bez te nivelacije ljudskog i bozanskog zakona, tj. njihovom prodvrgavanju istom pravu. Stari Grci su znali da dela bogova prate Sudjaje, jednako kao i dela smrtnika, pazeci da ne prekorace meru. Zato su mozda i svoje politicke zastupnike birali zrebom. Mozda bi to bio ozbiljan udar na raspomamljenu demokratsku samosvest i "volju naroda", ako bismo uveli princip lutrije pri izboru svojih predstavnika, kao i znacajan korak u pravcu zasnivanja vladavine prava a ne ljudi.

perica said...

In my view, Mankiw's text is not interesting as a moral justification of taxation, but as a fallatious argument based on smuggled ill-founded tacit assumptions. His attempt to justify taxation fails of course, but this fact is concealed by glossing over obviously false premises.
Let's first see what Mankiw is saying in a nutshell. He proposes a Just Deserts Theory of taxation, based on the premise that "people should get what they deserve" and consequently should not get what they do not deserve. No contest there. Then he goes on to state that negative externalizers should be taxed and positive externalizers should be subsidized. He concludes that Pigovian tax is thus justified.
Hmmm. Wait a minute.
Free market rewards and punishes justly, both in the long run via returns for contributed goods and services, and in the short run, via private courts and security firms hired by free-market insurance industry. People do get what they deserve on the free market. Moreover, they get it most efficiently, in the sense that even when they do get more or less than what they deserve, this injustice is quickly and locally rectified, if indeed it is an injustice. Where a business adversely affects its neighbors, they, backed by insurance companies, bring this grievance to private court and exact just compensation. Where a business produces positive side-effects (almost a universal situation) it grows in stature and prestige and is therefore justly rewarded. Practically there is no need for the notion of "externalities".
Not so when one makes (tacit) assumption that justice can only be furnished by the monopoly of force, as Mankiw does. Since this is by necessity a poor quality justice, very slow and very costly, it is incapable of efficiently judging who is directly affected by activities of a business. It circumvents this by inventing general externalities i.e. externalities affecting any and all, neighbors and non-neighbors alike, even though this is obviously not true. Positive and negative externalities thus falsely become "public good" and "public bad" respectively. This now "justifies" Pigovian taxation. Actually, a shortcoming of monopolized state-supplied justice is used as a rationale for state taxation. Injustice is used as a justification for more injustice.
Then Mankiw smuggles another tacit assumption - that the tax collector can somehow determine who deserves what and, more to the point, who deserves less and how much less (negative externalizers) and who deserves more and how much more (positive externalizers) than they get. This is also fallatious. Being ordinary people, tax collectors are far inferior to free market in determining contributions and rewards. Therefore, being based on false premises, the conclusion is refuted - Pigovian tax is unjust and immoral.
The fallacy of Mankiw's argument is not in his logic but in the premises which he does not make explicit. But this is all quite elementary. How can he not see this?

Marko Paunović said...

Zeljka,

Uglavnom se ne slazem ni ja, ali mi se ucinilo zanimljivim.

perice,

Sto na engleskom???

perica said...

Ko razume svatiće. :) U stvari nema nekog specijalnog razloga, tako mi došlo.

Dejan said...

Zeljka: "najveca vrednost americke demokratije je u sustini proceduralna - u podeli vlasti a i u beskonacnom komplikovanim procedurama u svim granama, a narocito zakonodavnoj."

Citam na drugom blogu, Borislav Pekic iz Engleske (pre jedno 30-tak godina): "Ne­dav­no sam upo­znao mla­du nadu ovdašnje stran­ke. Pošto je održala više bli­stav no bi­star go­vor o čari­ma i pred­no­sti­ma de­mo­kra­ti­je, nepogrešivo­sti slo­bod­nog na­rod­nog ra­zu­ma i vi­so­kim mo­ral­nim oba­ve­za­ma poli­ti­ke, pri­vat­no mi je ta nada re­kla: da je glav­na pred­nost de­mo­kra­ti­je u tome što je ne­po­sti­zi­va, da mu, dok svoj ra­zum ima, ničiji dru­gi nije po­tre­ban, da je po­li­ti­ka nužno naj­ne­mo­ral­ni­ji ob­lik jav­ne de­lat­no­sti i da je sva­ki političar od za­na­ta, shod­no tome, jed­no­vre­me­no pro­iz­vođač ko­nop­ca za vešanje i dželat."