Antitrust u Evropi

Dobar tekst gde se analizira praksa evropske antimonopolske politike u slučajevima Grundig United Brands. Staro pravilo da antitrustni zvaničnici teže da umesto potrošača odluče šta je korisno za njih i ovde je na delu. Sledeća dva pasaža opisuju neke elementarne činjenice koje bi bile dovoljne da se ti zakoni potpuno ukinu:

After the antitrust measure, then, the market is not more competitive. Instead it simply has a different competitive structure. Is the post-intervention structure more efficient than the unhampered one? Because this intervention favors one group of customers at the expense of another, it is impossible to tell. What we can know is that the structure of the competition has been changed away from the pattern driven by consumer demand toward a criterion arbitrarily determined by the antitrust authority,
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From an economical point of view, however, the cost of entry cannot be considered a barrier to entry. Of course, every business requires initial investments and the larger the business the higher will be the upfront cost. But to consider the cost of entry an illegitimate barrier is to say that anyone — no matter how poor, inexperienced, or inefficient — should be able to compete with United Brand.