Nekako sam naleteo na pismo Kena Rogoffa Josephu Stiglitzu od pre 10 godina, a koje i dalje stoji na sajtu MMF-a. Obavezno pročitati. Između ostalog:
Let's look at Stiglitzian prescriptions for helping a distressed emerging market debtor, the ideas you put forth as superior to existing practice. Governments typically come to the IMF for financial assistance when they are having trouble finding buyers for their debt and when the value of their money is falling. The Stiglitzian prescription is to raise the profile of fiscal deficits, that is, to issue more debt and to print more money. You seem to believe that if a distressed government issues more currency, its citizens will suddenly think it more valuable. You seem to believe that when investors are no longer willing to hold a government's debt, all that needs to be done is to increase the supply and it will sell like hot cakes. We at the IMF—no, make that we on the Planet Earth—have considerable experience suggesting otherwise. We earthlings have found that when a country in fiscal distress tries to escape by printing more money, inflation rises, often uncontrollably. Uncontrolled inflation strangles growth, hurting the entire populace but, especially the indigent. The laws of economics may be different in your part of the gamma quadrant, but around here we find that when an almost bankrupt government fails to credibly constrain the time profile of its fiscal deficits, things generally get worse instead of better.
Let's look at Stiglitzian prescriptions for helping a distressed emerging market debtor, the ideas you put forth as superior to existing practice. Governments typically come to the IMF for financial assistance when they are having trouble finding buyers for their debt and when the value of their money is falling. The Stiglitzian prescription is to raise the profile of fiscal deficits, that is, to issue more debt and to print more money. You seem to believe that if a distressed government issues more currency, its citizens will suddenly think it more valuable. You seem to believe that when investors are no longer willing to hold a government's debt, all that needs to be done is to increase the supply and it will sell like hot cakes. We at the IMF—no, make that we on the Planet Earth—have considerable experience suggesting otherwise. We earthlings have found that when a country in fiscal distress tries to escape by printing more money, inflation rises, often uncontrollably. Uncontrolled inflation strangles growth, hurting the entire populace but, especially the indigent. The laws of economics may be different in your part of the gamma quadrant, but around here we find that when an almost bankrupt government fails to credibly constrain the time profile of its fiscal deficits, things generally get worse instead of better.
8 comments:
Mislim da je svojedobno Speaker ostavio isti ovaj link u nekom svom komentaru. Kako god, pismo je zaslužilo poseban post, hvala Marko.
Zanima me da li je neko od blogera ili komentatora TR-a citao ili bar listao Rogoff-ovu knjigu "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly"?
Knjiga je velika (500 strana) i dobila je endorsments od Ezra Klein-a do William Easterly-a, pa me zanima da li je vredna citanja.
Ja sam je uzeo ali sam je do kraja mnogo više listao nego čitao. Ima mnogo podataka, tabela i grafikona a malo originalne teorije. Što se tiče finansijske krize bolja je knjiga Jeffreyja Friedmana i Wladimira Krausa, a uz to i mnogo kraća.
Slavisa:
Hvala puno. Btw, hteo sam upravo tebe da pitam sta mislis o Huntsmanovom planu za financijsku reformu. To je sve kao da je prepisao od Simon Johnsona o razbijanju banaka a ima i o Bazelu itd. Posto si ti pisao o Bazelu i o krizi uopsteno, bilo bi zanimljivo da napises nesto o Huntsmanovom planu, posto su njegovi predlozi drugaciji od ostalih GOP kandidata.
Meni ta ideja o usitnjavanju banaka da rastu uopšte nije jasna. Problem kod ove krize nije bio što su neke pojedinačne banke bile prevelike, nego što su sve banke radile isto -- što su stvarale i kupovale vrstu aktive za koju su mislili da je bezrizična a ispalo je da je vrlo rizična. Da li se trilion dolara hipotekarnih obveznica ili državnih obveznica raspodeli na 5 velikih banaka ili na 50 manjih banaka nije važno, to je opet trilion dolara problematične aktive.
Ideja je verovatno da ce lakse da puste da propadne neka banka koja ima 1,23% trzista, nego neka koja ima 23%. Nema too big to fail banaka.
Pa to je ideja, ali ako kriza nastaje zbog sistematskog kupovanja pogrešne vrste hartije, kao što se desilo sada, onda umesto jedne banke od 25% tržišta propada 5 sa po 5% tržišta. Što onda u zbiru dođe na isto.
Isto i u evropskoj krizi, nije jedna ili dve banke, nego su sve kupovale isto, AAA državni dug.
Družiće se Rogoff i Krugman kod Zakarije na CNNu sutra.
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